The role of squeezing in quantum key distribution with continuous variables based on homodyne detection and post-selection is investigated. It is shown that amplitude squeezing creates strong correlations between the signals of the legitimate receiver and a potential eavesdropper. Postselection of the received pulses can therefore be used to reduce the eavesdropper's knowledge of the raw key, which increases the secret key rate by orders of magnitude over large distances even for modest amounts of squeezing.
Introduction
Quantum cryptography or quantum key distribution was first proposed nearly two decades ago [1] as a method to exploit properties of small quantum systems to establish a secret key between a sender (Alice) and a receiver (Bob) which is provably secure against attacks by an eavesdropper (Eve). In recent years this field has attracted a lot of research and rapid progress has been achieved in the theoretical description and in experimental demonstrations. In particular, the range over which a secure key can be established has now been extended up to 101 km in optical fibres [2, 3, 4] and 23 km in air [5, 6] . However, most of these systems are based on the transmission of single photons and suffer from inefficient and slow single-photon sources and detectors. These technical restrictions lead to very low secret key bit rates, e.g. down to 15 bit/s in the case of [2] , and to a maximum distance beyond which no secure key can be transmitted at all [7] .
In order to overcome these limitations, a new class of quantum cryptosystems has been proposed, where information is encoded in continuous variables such as field quadratures [8, 9, 10, 11] , photon numbers [12] , or polarisation [13] . These schemes are based on the transmission of non-classical states of light, i.e. squeezed or entangled states, and are restricted to transmission lines with less than 50 % loss.
Very recently, however, it has been shown that quantum key distribution can operate over arbitrarily lossy channels using only classical, i.e. coherent, quantum states of light. This is achieved by reverse reconciliation techniques [14] or by post-selection [15, 16] . The first quantum crypto-system of this kind has already been demonstrated by Grangier and co-workers [17] .
In this paper, the effect of squeezing on the performance of quantum key distribution with post-selection is investigated. For the schemes operating with transmission lines with less than 50% loss [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] , squeezing guarantees that the smaller part of the pulse lost in the transmission respectively intercepted by Eve has much larger quantum uncertainties and thus less information than the larger part received by Bob. One therefore might think that for losses larger than 50%, where Eve potentially has access to a larger fraction of the pulse than Bob, squeezing might act in favour of the eavesdropper. The main purpose of this work is to show that squeezing still is beneficial beyond the 50% loss limit in post-selection based schemes.
This work is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the quantum key distribution scheme [16] . Then two specific eavesdropping attacks are investigated which clearly demonstrate the merits of using squeezed states. The first attack, discussed in section 3, is a simultaneous measurement attack where Eve attempts to measure both quadrature components simultaneously and resends a pulse to Bob according to her measurement results. It is shown that squeezing increases Bob's bit error rate when this kind of attack is used and therefore facilitates the detection of Eve's presence. The second attack, discussed in section 4, is a superior channel attack, where Eve keeps that part of the pulse which would normally be lost in the transmission channel from Alice to Bob, and transmits the rest of the pulse through a lossless channel to Bob. This kind of attack cannot be detected by Alice and Bob, and is thought to be the ideal eavesdropping technique which leaves Eve with the largest possible amount of information. However, due to the entanglement between Bob's and Eve's parts of the initial pulse induced by the squeezing, the post-selection process increases Bob's information rate at the cost of Eve's, thereby allowing for much higher secret key rates than with coherent (non-squeezed) states. In section 5 the optimum choice for the pulse intensity and for the post-selection threshold are calculated depending on the squeezing parameter and the transmission efficiency and the corresponding maximum secret key rate is investigated. Finally, the results are summarised in section 6.
Quantum key distribution with homodyne detection and post-selection
The scheme presented here is a generalisation of the recent proposal by Namiki and Hirano [16] , where Alice sends squeezed states instead of coherent (classical) pulses. Without the post-selection process the scheme is also equivalent to the scheme by Funk and Raymer [12] which is based on the simultaneous transmission of two pulses in orthogonal polarisation states obtained from a parametric amplification process. It can be shown by a unitary transformation that the latter entangled state is equivalent to a product state of a weak amplitudesqueezed pulse (corresponding to the pulse sent by Alice here) and a strong (phase-squeezed) pulse (the local oscillator used for homodyne detection). The scheme works as follows. First, Alice prepares a minimum-uncertainty squeezed pulse with field amplitude α 0 and squeezing parameter r. Both α 0 and r are assumed to be real numbers, r > 0 corresponds to an amplitude-squeezed state, r < 0 to a phase-squeezed state, and r = 0 to a coherent state. Alice then applies a phase shift θ ∈ {0, π/2, π, 3π/2} to the pulse, where θ = 0 (θ = π/2) is interpreted as a bit 1 in basis 1 (basis 2) and θ = π (θ = 3π/2) as a bit 0 in basis 1 (2) . The resulting state reads
where a (a † ) is Alice's photon annihilation (creation) operator and |0 is the vacuum state. Next, Alice sends this state through the quantum channel to Bob. During this transmission the pulse experiences attenuation, that is, a fraction of the pulse is either absorbed by the environment or intercepted by Eve. In both cases the transmission is modeled by a beam-splitter of amplitude transmission T and reflection R, where T 2 + R 2 = 1. The output mode operators (b, b † ) and (e, e † ) correspond to the modes in Bob's and Eve's detectors, respectively, and are related to the input mode operators (a, a † ) and the additional (vacuum) input mode (v, v † ) of the beam-splitter by
For the following it is convenient to express the quantum state of the transmitted pulse |ψ θ in terms of its Wigner quasi-probability function for Bob's (complex) measurement variable β and Eve's variable ǫ. One finds
where R and I denote real and imaginary parts, respectively, and
In the next step of the quantum key distribution protocol, Bob randomly decides which of the two basis sets he uses for his detection. If he chooses basis 1 he measures the real part β r of his variable β by homodyne detection, otherwise he measures the imaginary part β i . His measurement results follow the probability distributions
If his measurement result fulfills |β r,i | < β c , where β c is a fixed threshold value, Bob tells Alice to disregard this bit. Otherwise he assigns value 1 to his bit if β r,i > β c , or value 0 if β r,i < −β c . This post-selection is the key to allow for quantum key distribution over, in principle, arbitrarily large distances [15, 16] . Alice and Bob additionally announce their used basis sets and disregard all bits where they used different sets.
After this step, Alice and Bob share a string of bits which in general contains some errors and about which Eve has a certain amount of information. Alice and Bob thus use (classical) error correction and privacy amplification protocols which leaves them with an identical secret key about which Eve has only negligible information.
As an example let us assume that Alice sends the state |ψ 0 , i.e. θ = 0. In this case, Bob's probabilities read
For an amplitude-squeezed state (r > 0), Bob thus finds a Gaussian distribution with a narrow width if he measures the quadrature β r , and a broad width for measurements of β i . The probability of finding a bit 1 or 0 in the correct basis (basis 1 in the example here) is thus
where Φ denotes the usual error function. For r = 0 equations (7)- (10) reduce to the results found in [16] . The fraction of accepted bits is
where the factor 1/2 comes from disregarding all bits where Alice and Bob use different basis sets, and the bit error rate of accepted bits is
.
The expected amount of Shannon information shared by Alice and Bob per accepted bit is obtained by averaging over Bob's measurement outcomes,
where
is the bit error rate conditioned on Bob's measured value of β r . Thus the average information gain per transmitted bit is An example for the quantities (11)-(15) as a function of the threshold value β c is shown in figure 1 . For the chosen parameters and for β c = 0, half of all transmitted bits are accepted, but the bit error rate is relatively large and thus the information I AB per accepted bit is low. Increasing β c reduces r acc but also decreases the bit error rate. The figure shows that the average information gain G AB per bit decreases with increasing β c . It therefore seems advantageous for Bob to set β c = 0. However, in a realistic setup Alice and Bob will try to optimise the secret key bit rate, i.e. the difference between their shared information and the information leaked to Eve. This subject will be discussed later in sections 4 and 5. Note that due to the form of the expressions (9), (10) the qualitative behaviour of the quantities plotted in figure 1 is the same for all squeezing parameters r and transmission coefficients T .
Simultaneous measurement attack
In this section I will investigate the security of the protocol against eavesdropping attacks where Eve intercepts each pulse, performs a measurement on it, and then sends a pulse to Bob in the state which she thinks was initially prepared by Alice. Since much of the discussion in [16] on this kind of attacks also holds qualitatively in the case of initially squeezed pulses, I will not give a detailed analysis here but concentrate on one specific eavesdropping strategy and discuss the merits of squeezing in this context.
The attack investigated here is the simultaneous measurement attack. For this, Eve splits the pulse into two parts on a 50-50 beam-splitter, measures one quadrature component in one output arm, and simultaneously the orthogonal quadrature component in the other arm.
Eve's measurement results are described by the expressions derived in section 2 if T = R = 1/ √ 2 and assuming that Eve performs measurements on both output arms of the beam-splitter (2) . Specifically, let us assume that Eve measures β r and ǫ i . The joint probability distribution is given by which for all parameters factorises into two independent probability distributions
For θ = 0, P θ (β r ) is given by equation (7) and
with T 2 = R 2 = 1/2. If Eve's measurement outcome is (β r , ǫ i ) she will attribute the pulse to the value θ ∈ {0, π/2, π, 3π/2} for which P θ (β r , ǫ i ) is maximum. For r ≤ 0 this yields θ = 0 for β r ≥ |ǫ i |, θ = π/2 for ǫ i > |β r |, θ = π for −β r ≥ |ǫ i |, θ = 3π/2 for −ǫ i > |β r |. For r > 0, which is the interesting case for the purpose of this work, finding the most probable value of θ is more complicated. Let us assume that Eve finds β r , ǫ i > 0. She will then attribute this result to θ = 0 if
The remaining areas in the quadrant β r , ǫ i > 0 are attributed to θ = π/2, and the results for the other three quadrants of (β r , ǫ i ) follow by symmetry. As an example, figure 2 shows the area which Eve identifies with θ = π/2. The probability p corr that Eve guesses the state sent by Alice correctly is thus given by
where A 0 is the area defined by (19). Figure 3 shows the effects which Eve's simultaneous measurement attack has on Bob's bit error rate δ for various parameters. For any given post-selection threshold β c and squeezing parameter r, Alice adjusts the mean amplitude α 0 such that δ = 10 −3 for lossless transmission and without Eve's interference. The values for α 0 for r = 0 and r = 0.5 are shown in figure 3 (a) together with the resulting fraction of accepted bits r acc (the abscissa of the plot is scaled such that this curve is identical for all values of r). Figure 3(b) shows Eve's probability p corr of success and the bit error rate δ measured by Bob after Eve's attack. One sees that for any amount of squeezing the sensitivity of δ to Eve's attack can be increased by increasing β c . The reason for this is that larger post-selection thresholds allow for the use of weaker pulses, see figure (a), which in turn gives larger overlaps of the pulses corresponding to different values of θ in Eve's measurement. However, larger thresholds also lead to lower bit acceptance rates and thus slower secret key generation. The use of squeezed pulses helps to avoid this problem, since in this case already low values of β c lead to a low probability of success for Eve's attack. This is due to the lower intensity of the pulses sent by Alice, see figure (a), and the increased uncertainty in the quadrature components measured by Eve because of the vacuum noise on the second input port of Eve's beam-splitter. It should also be emphasized that the change in δ is only one possibility for Alice and Bob to detect Eve's presence. Other possibilities include the distribution of Bob's measured quadrature components [16] or the measured value of r acc .
Superior channel attack
In the second eavesdropping attack discussed in this paper, Eve is assumed to possess an ideal quantum memory and a lossless channel. She splits that part of the pulse which would normally be lost in the transmission channel from Alice to Bob, stores it in her quantum memory and sends the rest of the pulse through the lossless channel to Bob. She then waits for Bob's public announcement which basis he used and afterwards she measures the correct quadrature component of her part of the pulse. This kind of attack cannot be detected by Alice and Bob since Eve's interference is indistinguishable from the standard transmission loss. This attack has been shown to be the ideal eavesdropping attack for other continuous variable crypto-systems and is also expected to be ideal in post-selection schemes [15] , such as the one investigated here, and in reverse reconciliation schemes [14] . Since Alice and Bob cannot infer Eve's presence from their data, they have to assume the worst case and therefore attribute all of their transmission losses to Eve. In order to establish a secure key it is necessary to derive an upper bound of the information available to Eve, such that in the final stage of the protocol Eve's knowledge about the key can be reduced to arbitrarily low levels using privacy amplification. Here I will derive such an upper bound following the lines of Lütkenhaus [18, 7] .
The fundamental quantity of the following derivation is the joint measurement probability P θ (β r , ǫ r )
that Bob obtains the value β r and simultaneously Eve obtains ǫ r when Alice sends a pulse |ψ θ . For θ = 0 this can be evaluated as P 0 (β r , ǫ r ) = 2 π e r exp −2 e 2r (T β r − Rǫ r − α 0 ) 2 + (Rβ r + T ǫ r ) 2 .
For coherent states, r = 0, this can be factorised and hence Bob's and Eve's measurements are independent. For squeezed states, on the other hand, the joint probability distribution does not factorise and the two measurements are correlated. In particular, for r > 0 as depicted in figure 4 , the measurements are anti-correlated, that is, if Bob measures a relatively large value of β r , Eve is likely to measure a small value of ǫ r . Hence, by choosing a larger postselection threshold Bob can increase Eve's bit error rate and thus reduce Eve's information.
Assuming ideal error correction and privacy amplification, a lower bound for the gain of secret information per transmitted pulse is given by [18, 7] S AB = r acc (I AB − τ )
where r acc is given by (11) , I AB by (13) , and the fraction τ by which the raw key is shortened during privacy amplification is Here, P c is the collision probability given by [18] 
and
is Eve's probability distribution under the condition that a pulse θ was sent and that Bob accepted the bit in his post-selection. Equation (26) can be evaluated analytically, yielding P 0 (ǫ r |β c < |β r |) = P 0 (ǫ r ) P (0) + P (1) 1
where P 0 (ǫ r ) = 2 π exp −2 (ǫr+Rα0) 2
For r = 0, this simplifies to P 0 (ǫ r |β c < |β r |) = P 0 (ǫ r ) due to the independence of Bob's and Eve's measurements. Equations (13) and (25) must be calculated numerically in order to get the secret key bit rate S AB , equation (23). Figure 5 shows the secret key bit rate S AB as a function of α 0 and β c for coherent pulses (r = 0) and for squeezed pulses (r = 0.5). In contrast to the average gain of information G AB as shown in figure 1 , the amount of secret information S AB assumes a maximum for finite values of α 0 and β c . Therefore, Alice and Bob can optimise their parameters to achieve the highest key bit rate once they have measured the transmission loss of their quantum channel. Moreover, comparing figures 5(a) and (b) one notes that the maximum of S AB can be increased by using squeezed light. This is due to the strong correlations between Bob's and Eve's measurements in this case as discussed above. 
Optimised key bit rate
Let us now investigate the maximum secret key bit rate in dependence of the channel loss and the amount of squeezing used in the experiment. To this end S AB is optimised numerically with respect to α 0 and β c for various squeezing parameters r and channel losses R 2 . Figure 6 shows the optimised values of α 0 , β c and S AB for three different values of r as a function of the loss R 2 . Generally, α 0 is of the order of 1 and is slightly decreasing with increasing loss for coherent states (r = 0) and weakly squeezed states (r = 0.5). For strong squeezing (r = 2) there is a maximum of α 0 at around R 2 ≈ 0.5. The ideal post-selection threshold β c , on the other hand, is always increasing from close to zero at low losses to values of approximately 2 to 3 at R 2 = 0.96. The maximum of S AB is close to 0.5 at low loss, decreases relatively slowly for moderate losses and drops dramatically for high losses of about 90-95%. Using squeezed light increases S AB , in particular for large values of R 2 .
The advantage of squeezing is even more apparent in figure 7 , where S AB is plotted as a function of r for fixed loss rates. For 50% loss, S AB = 0.04 for r = 0 and 0.14 for r = 2. For 75% loss, S AB increases approximately from 0.003 to 0.03, and for 90% loss from 6 × 10 −6 to 10 −3 . Note that most of the increase in S AB already occurs by introducing a modest amount of squeezing, for example for r = 0.5 one finds S AB = 3 × 10 −4 at R 2 = 0.9, i.e. an increase by a factor of 50 compared to coherent states with r = 0.
Conclusions
In this work, I have investigated the effects of using squeezed pulses of light in continuous-variable quantum key distribution with post-selection [15, 16] . In this scheme, Alice prepares the pulses in one of four squeezed states corresponding to the bit values 0 and 1 in two non-orthogonal basis sets. Bob uses homodyne detection to measure one of the two orthogonal quadrature components and disregards all bits where his measured value is below a certain post-selection threshold.
In particular, two kind of eavesdropping strategies have been investigated. The first is a capture-resend attack where Eve attempts to measure both quadrature components of a pulse simultaneously. It has been shown that using squeezed pulses renders the scheme more robust against this kind of attack, as it reduces Eve's chances of guessing the correct state of the pulse. In principle, Alice and Bob can achieve a similar level of security with coherent pulses, i.e. without squeezing, by increasing the post-selection threshold but only at the cost of a smaller key bit rate.
The second eavesdropping strategy considered in this paper is a superior channel attack where Eve's interference with the quantum communication is indistinguishable from the channel loss. A lower bound has been derived for the secure key bit rate which Alice and Bob can obtain by ideal error correction and privacy amplification. Here, squeezing introduces strong (anti-)correlations between Bob's and Eve's measurement results. These correlations allow Bob to restrict Eve's knowledge about the transmitted bits by the post-selection process. For a given channel loss, the secure key bit rate can be maximised by a proper choice of the pulse amplitude and of the post-selection threshold. The calculations show that already modest amounts of squeezing, such as a squeezing parameter of r = 0.5 (approximately 60% squeezing below shot noise), can increase the maximum secure key bit rate by about two orders of magnitude for transmission losses of 90%, corresponding to transmission through 50 km of optical fibre with losses of 0.2 dB/km.
In conclusion, this work shows that squeezing is not an essential requirement for secure quantum key distribution, in accordance with earlier results [14, 15, 16, 17] . However, it will in general increase the security of the scheme against eavesdropping and can thereby significantly increase the amount of secure information transmitted per pulse.
